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In the Supreine Court
of the

State of Utah

CHARLES HINKSOX,
Respondent,

Respondent's Brief
-vs.-

Case No.

7210

CAR:JIIN C. BOXAXXI,
Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Respondent agrees with the statement of the case
as set forth in appellant's brief with the exception of
his statement concerning the second cause of action. In
the second cause of action respondent's claim was not
hased upon,
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''A commission of 80% of the sales price on
alleged sales of Christmas merchandise''
but was based on 80% of the premium sales price, that
is, the difference between the standard price and a
premium price for immediate delivery plus a commission of 5% on the standard price.
STATE~fENT

OF FACTS
It will serve no useful purpose to summarize the
facts as stated in the brief of appellant which takes
the form of copying the record. There is no dispute
concerning the following facts:
1. During the period in question vVilliam W. Barton was sales ma·nager of appellant company and as
sales manager was authorized to contact and employ
other salesmen on commission.

2. Barton in the course of his employment was
authorized by appellant to employ respondent as a
salesman. ( Tr. 73)
3. The respondent was employed as a salesman hy
appellant (question and answer to interrogatory no. 10
of deposition and Tr. 156, 157).
4. Orders taken by respondent in the course of
employment which continued for approximately 10
weeks were filled by appellant.
5. Some commissions on orders taken "·rre paitl
by appellant to respondent.
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QUESTIONS INVOLVED
It is the position of Respondent the Court by its
judgment in effect granted respondent's motion to
strike that part of the deposition which was based upon
the business practice and customary procedure of the
appellant. The motion to strike was made at the proper
time and the Court at the conclusion of the case stated:

"The court will consider that and leave that
motion under adYisement pending the determination of the case." ( Tr. 203)
In rendering judgment for respondent we assume
that the Court granted respondent's motion and excluded this evidence; however, if there be any ambiguity respondent hereby cross assigns as error the Court'B
denial of the motion.
Respondent's main argument '"ill be in reply to
the three questions raised hy appellant and will take
the follmving form:
1. There was no error in admitting the testimony
of respondent since all statements were made in the
scope of the agency and were corroborated by other
tP~timonies and facts.

2.

Substantial evidence adduced at the trial support~ findings of fact number 3 of the first cause of
artion in support of the judgment.
3. Suh~tantial evide>nee adduced at the trial supports the finding of fact~ nurnher 2 of the srrond cause
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of action in support of the judgment.

ARGUMENT
1. THERE WAS NO ERROR IN ADMITTING
THE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT.
It is the opinion of respondent that appellant has
confused the law in respect to the admission of the
testimony of statements of an agent. The question
here is not whether Barton was an agent of the appellant and whether testimony of his statements should
be admitted to prove this agency. There has been no
denial that Barton was the agent. By the admission
and testimony of the principal Barton was a sales
manager authorized to employ salesmen and in the
course of his employment employed appellant. There
was no objection to the admissions of appellant that
Barton was an agent and once having proved this
agency the remaining questions were:

1.

Did Barton make the statements as an agent 1

2. In making such statements was he acting within the scope of his authority?
In 2 Corp. J ur. 940, it is stated:
"\Vhere the agency has been established hy
independent evidence, the declarations of the
agent are competent to show that he acted a:;
agent and not on his individual account, or to show
the nature and extent of his authority,"
Here the statements made in the preliminary ronSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Yt>rsation and later by :J[r. Barton by telephone ·were
not introduced for the purpose of establishing an
agency but were for the purpose of showing the contract
terms, of proYing the offer of employ1nent, the acceptance of the offer by the appellant, and the subsequent
ratification of the contract after respondent affirmed
the contract of employment as he was given to understand it had been agreed upon.
\Ye, therefore, submit that the following statement
of the Law as found in Restatement of Law of Agency,
section 284, volume 2, page 637 applies:
"In actions between the principal and third
parties, eYidence of a statement hy an agent is
admissable for or against either party for the
purpose of proving that such statement was
made, if the fact that the statement was made
constitutes, or is relevant in the proof of, one
of the alternate fact~ to be established in order
to maintain a cause of action or difference''
And as found in section 289, page 251 :
''Evidence of statements of agents whether
or not such statements are authorized, is admissable in favor of and against the principal, if
admissable under the general rules of evidence
a~ to the admissability of such statements by such
prrsons not agents.''
For the sake of argtunent, if we assume that Barton had instructions from his principal as to his limitations in hiring new salesmen, there is no rule of evi(lrnee prohibiting the introrlurtion of tPsthnony conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cerning statements made by such an agent which might
have exceeded such authority. Such a rule of law
would defeat any claim whatsoever against a principal
if the agent had exceeded his authority, and the principal could thereby absolve himself of any liability by
drawing up a strict limitation on the agent's authority,
which limitations would not be known by the third party.
From the evidence it is apparent that Barton was
clothed with general authority and was in no way a
limited agent. He was sales manager in charge of all
salesmen of the company, had authority to employ new
salesmen, in the scope of this authority he had hired
many salesmen, had run an advertisement in a Salt
Lake newspaper for the purpose of securing salesmen,
had interviewed six salesmen, had employed respondent,
had given respondent a four-day traning course, had
supplied respondent with order books, samples, stationery, and later, credit rating information and had
even after the termination of the employment attempted
to employ respondent as District Supervisor. 'Ve submit that, in the first place, all of these facts conclusively
prove that there was corroboration of the authority of
Barton as an agent, and secondly they would be an indication to any reasonable person draling with him
that he had unlimited authority to rmploy salesmen in
accordance with the statements and promises he made
as an inducement to any salesmen he was attempting
to employ.
In admitting the statements of the agent the lowrr
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It

court was not in en'or but was following the law as
adopted in this state by this court. The statements of
the agent were admissable for the purpose of proving
the contract and were necessary in order to establish a
cause of action against the principal respondent. To
haYe excluded this evidence on the ground that the
statement went beyond his authority would have been
in conflict with the rule of la-w as stated in the case of
Harrison vs. Auto Securities Co. et al. 70 Utah 11, 257
Pac. 677:
"It is the general principle of the law of
agency, running through on contracts made by
the agents with third parties, that the principals
are bound hy the acts of their agents ~which fall
within the apparent scope of authority of thP
agents, and that the principals will not be permitted to deny the authority of their agents
against innocent third parties, \Vho have dealt
with those agents in good faith. That general
principle of agency is universally recognized and
applied by the Courts, and is laid down by evrry
text-writer who has written upon the subject of
agency."

It is true that the principal testified in his deposition that the agent had specific and limited authority,
hut aecordinp; to the testimony Barton did not testify
that he had at any time told respondent that he was
limited in his authority.
The rules as set forth in Dohrman Supply Co. vs.
Rrnu Brummell, 99 Utah 188, 103 Par. (2nd) 360 and
Yarlnrr ,.s. Rozzelle, 88 Utah 162, 45 Par. (2nd) 561, do
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not apply because in those cases the third party knew
he was dealing with ·a special agent with limited authority. Here the third party had a right to rely on statements made by the -agent because they were within the
apparent authority of the agent. Certainly an agent
empowered to employ a salesman on commission would
be authorized to set the rate of commission; likewise it
would be within his apparent authority to designate the
territory the salesman was to work in, and the type of
customers he was to sell. All of these acts are within
the apparent authority conferred upon an ·agent as
that term has been defined in the concurring opinion of
Justice Wolfe in the case of Skerl vs. vVillow Creek
Coal Company, 92 Utah 474, 69 Pacific (2nd) 507.
"Apparent authority must be "apparent";
that is, the act in question which is done by the
agent must be such an one which would seem to
be within the purview of his actual authority. * *
In other words, the work which the agent is really
authorized to do must be such that the act which
he does and in regard to which his authority i~
in question or reasonably connected with that
work or authority which he actually ha~ or he
cannot be apparently authorized.''
Evidently the lower court was of the opinion in
answer to appellant's plea to sympathy on page 32 of
his brief that a principal is in a position to protect himself under the circumstances related therein. It woulrl
have been a simple matter for either the principal or
agent to have insisted that as a condition to thr rmSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ployment of respondent he must sign a contract sin1ilar
to exhibit 8. This principal on the contrary made it possible for ·an agent to hold out any type of inducement
to prospectiYe salesmen and then en1ploy such salesmen
to their detriment. The evidence was that no contract
was signed or received by the principal, yet the agent
was considered to have been employed on September
16th, and not until two months later was there any indication that the principal would not perform in accordance with the terms of employment as previously
stat.ed by the agent. The authorities ·are unanimous
that any :principal that clothes such an agent with such
authority and does not act to rescind such ,authority
but on the contrary in effect ratifies the acts of the
agent is bound by the acts of the agent.
2. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT
THE TRIAL SUPPORTS FINDING OF FACTS
NO. 3 OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDG~iENT.
Counsel for appellant has apparently conceded
that they are bound by the following rule set forth in
.Jensen vs. Logan City, 96 Utah 53, 83 Pacific (2nd) 311:
''The rule is well established that it is not for
this Court in a law case to weigh evidence or
determine credibility of witnesses. If there is
any substantial evidence in support of findings
it must be sustained."
'Ve suhmit that the testimony of respondent clearly
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established a contract of employment which authorized
respondent to pass upon credit after he had made an
investigation of the credit responsibility of prospective
customers. It is true appellant had the right to reject
the order if the respondent had not offered credit according to the instructions or the appellant had received outside information that the customer was not
a good credit risk. In other words there was substantial evidence adduced ·at the trial that respondent was
to determine the credit risk and appellant merely had
the right to reject the order upon substantiation of p_oor
credit. (Tr. 98 and 99, 122)
There is no conflict in the evidence that respondent
at all times followed the instructions as given to him
by ~1:r. Barton in respect to credit.

Q.

'' "\V ere all orders you secured from the Company in accordance with general instruction,;.;
and the agreement you had with Mr. Barton!

A.

Yes, Sir." (Tr. 99)

Furthermore the evidence was not controvertrd
that Barton led the respondent to believe that if he
followed the credit instructions, accepted orders, that
the orders would be filled unless there w·as justification
for credit reasons not to fill the order.

Q.

"As a matter of practice you assumed that
you would receive commission only on ordrr~
filled, didn't you~

A.

I assumed all orders would hr filled or ~uh-
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stantial reason for credit given why not
filled.

Q. The rPaBon you were complaining was you
had had orders turned down and no reasons
stated at all·?
A.

Xot a reason at all. I had wanted specific accountability." (Tr. 129)

On December 6th ·when respondent received Exhibit 7, there had been no disagreement on this phase
of the contract; one order was cancelled because of a
poor report from Dun & Bradstreet (Order #0841). No
claim has been made for a commission on this order.
Xo complete accounting was tendered to respondent
until the time of the trial when Exhibit 1 was submitted
as part of the deposition. If we exa1nine this exhibit
we at once recognize the fallacy of the argument of
appellant. This is not a case where the salesman sold
every prospective customer regardless of his credit
standing. He went to great lengths to sell only those
accounts which would be suitable dealers in the future
and had established credit. Of the some $38,000.00 in
orders taken, according to the account of ,appellant,
they had justification for refusing only five accounts
totaling $2,514.97, of which amount $1,024.50 was one
account. Even on these accounts, which appellant claims
WE'l'<' not good credit risks, no testimony was adduced
to the effect that these accounts did not maintain the
~tn.ndards specified by ~r r. Barton nor has appellant
at any timP substantiated his reasons for denying the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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account credit. In most of these cases the major part
of the order was filled but for some unexplainable
rea,son the balance of the, order was not accepted on
the grounds that the customer was a good credit risk
up to a certain point, but not beyond-the point of difference being only $100.00 or $200.00.
We, therefore, submit that there is ample evidence
in the record to sustain the lower Court's finding on
this point.

3. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT
THE TRIAL SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF FACTS
NU~IBER 2 OF THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTIOX
IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDG~IENT.
\Ve would be inclined to ,agree with counsel for appellant that respondent's claim in his second cause of
action "'ould be, ''preposterous on its face'', if the claim
\Yere made as set forth by appellant. No claim has bern
made, or is now made, that respondent is entitled to an
80 per cent commission on the premium sales, that is,
s,ales of hosiery made at a price in excess of the standard price. So that there will be no further misunderstanding in regard to these premium sales we shall take
liberty of summarizing the testimony as found_ in thr
record in regard to these sales.
Just before Christmas when the demand for hosirry
is greater than at any other time and the supply is
somewhat curtailed the retail merchant is willing to pay
a premium for delivery of a shipmGnt oYer and allow
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his ordinary quota if the shipn1ent is n1ade immediately.
According to the testimony :Jlr. Barton authorized respondent to charge certain select customers one or two
dollars more as a premium or as '• an overage fee". It
had been agreed upon between appellant's agent and
respondent that respondent was to receive his 5 per
cent commission on the normal price of such ~sales and
was to receiYe in addition 80 per cent of the overage.
Thus, if the salesman was succe~sful in selling a dozen
hose originally priced at $16.20 per dozen for $18.70, a
dozen for $13.90 originally priced at $12.90, and a dozen
for $11.75 originally priced at $10.75, he was to receive
not only 5 per cent on' the original price, but 80 per cent
of $2.50, $1.00, and $1.00, the premium or overage on
each sale.
e submit that if appellant's counsel will re-study
the transcript, he will have a more accurate understanding of this phase of the case. See particularly
page 99.
In response to demand for a bill of particulars
plaintiff filed a statement of his account (Tr. 23, 24). In
the second column of figures there has been segregated
the overage fee on every order submitted. Exhibits D
and E were introduced to prove this bill of particulars
and as examples of the orders sent in by respondent
and accepted by appellant. Included in these orders
were premium sales totaling $36.00 on Exhibit D and
$:21.00 on exhibit E. According to exhibit 7 of appellant all hnt $35.25 (or three dozen hose) of the order

"r
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represented by exhibit D was accepted and the entire
order represented by exhibit E was accepted including
the pren1ium price charges of $18.70, $13.90, and $11.73.
At the trial the Court was not inclined to have
respondent go through every order taken at a price
above the norm·al p~ice to prove that appellant had
knowledge of this premium sales agreement, and had
accepted the orders after receiving the proof of the
excess price charged. Since there was substantial evidence sufficient to convince the Court that there was
a contract agreed upon between Barton and respondent,
that orders were taken pursuant to s_uch contract, and
the orders ·were accepted and some were filled, the
Court felt justified in making a finding of fact in accordance with the complaint ·and bill of particulars.
It is true that the evidence indicates respondent
requested a confirmation from the principal of this
agreement; however, according to the evidence there
was a contract and he merely wanted the principal to
confirm it before he expanded any more time and money
in making such sales. In such a case as this we believr
the rule adopted under similar facts in the ea~e of
Peoples' ::\fercantile Company vs. Farmers' Cotton Finance Cqrp., 38 N. l\L 237, 31 Pac. (2nd) 252 applies.
There the fact that an agent stated that he could not
agree to commissions without consulting the principal,

1

1

"might well have been interpreted as a rlevi('P
to "stall", quite common in bargaining proee~RrR.
Defendant, having confe1Ted ostensihlP authority
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upon his agent and placed him in a position to
mislead the plaintiff as to his authority, cannot
thus eseape responsibility for plaintiff's having
been misled. See Restatement, Agenry, 170."
The record indicates that there was an agreen1ent
for commission to be paid of 80 per cent, and orders
were taken and accepted pursuant to this agreement.
· The only thing that the respondent felt was in view
of the fact that he had not been rredited with his commission of 80 per cent on the first accounting submitted
he was entitled to confirmation from the principal. Although there is no proof that the principal confirmed
this agreement, the record is clear that appellant benefited by receiving 95 per cent of the overage, which
benefit he is attempting to retain on the grounds that
no contract whatsoever was made in respect to this
overag·e. If, as claimed, there were no contract, there
was a duty on the appellant to rescind the agreement
or at least to advise respondent that the company would
refuse to fill the orders at a premium price.
4.

ALL EVIDENCE CONCERNING APPELLA~T 'S BUSINESS PRACTICES AND CUSTOJfARY PROCEDURES SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED.
During the trial the defendant attempted to introduce ('\'i(lence as to his practice in employing other
salesmen, the commissions they were paid, their limitations on arcepting credit an(l the quota of orders they
rould accept. Objections were timely made to the introSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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duction of such evidence and for the most part the
Court excluded this type of testimony; however, the
Court did not rule upon plaintiff's motion to strike that
part of the deposition which was objectionable on this
count. Accordingly appeHant has based much of his
argument on the premise that all of this evidence is
admissable.
We submit that the testimony clearly indicates that
respondent was employed under an oral contract in
order to accomplish an unusual assignment for appellant. First he was to open a new territory, and if he
were then successful, he was to become supervisor of
the Western Region. Once it was established that an
oral contract of employment had been agreed upon, all
evidence regarding the customary practices of appellant
was immaterial. See the case of Wade vs. Ford Motor
Company, 151 Kan. 425, 99 Pac. (2nd) 775, where the
Supreme Court of Kansas held that provisions of a
customary agency contract in writing are no defense
to an action based on an oral contract.
Aside from this general rule it is worth noting· that
although appellant seeks to justify his failure to account
because the claim does not conform to his usual business practices, he did not make the payments to respondent in the usual manner. Mr. Barton testified that
every salesman received $75.00 a week base pay and
commission over and above this amount which would
be :paid at the end of the month. Respondent, however,
was paid a straight 5 per cent commission and at no
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
time receiYed $75.00 per week, but on the contrary was
obligated to spend far in excess of this alleged amount
as traveling expenses. If appellant had considered
that Hinkson was just another salesman-employee, this
fact could have been brought to respondent's attention
by paying him weekly as was customary. Everything
points to the fact that this was an unusual contract,
that both parties knew that it was, and both parties
expected it to work out more advantageously than the
usual factory-traveling salesman arrangement. Therefore, all the evidence in regard to the usual procedure
should have been excluded.
SUMMARY
Based upon the testimony and the rules of Law it
is clear that no reversible error was committed by the
Lower Court in admitting all of the testimony of the
statements of the agent. The authority of Barton as
an agent having been duly established the Court was
justified in allowing proof of his statements made in
the apparent scope of his authority. The limits of the
agent's authority were not to be determined by the instructions of his principal in New Jersey but by the
statements he made, the reliance placed upon these
statements by respondent, and the acquiesances and
ratifications of the principal.
The Lower Court was not and should not have
heen concerned with the general practice of the appellant and his other agency contracts. The only point at
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18 .
issue was one particular oral contract involving out of
the ordinary transactions..
_1
There was substantial evidence· sufficient to sus-1
tain the Lower Court's finding on all points at issue. l
Accordingly the judgment of the Lower Court should
be affirmed.

l

i
'j

Respectfully submitted,
WHITE, WRIGHT & ARNOVITZ
and ALVIN I. SMITH,
Attorneys for Respondent
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